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 CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On September 10th, 2001 the United States enjoyed one of the most dynamic time periods 
in world politics.  In the 90’s, the Cold War as was known by the baby boomer 
generation had ended and the United States established itself as the lone true superpower 
in the world.  Despite a slight slowing of its economy when compared to the 90’s and 
several low level terrorist attacks American’s felt a sense of world calmness.  Most of 
America’s political and economic focus was on domestic and economic issues. 
 
Meanwhile, in Afghanistan a place that few Americans could identify on a map, there 
stood a Muslim extremist whose name was synonymous with the construction industry of 
the Middle East.  Osama Bin Laden whose father created the largest construction 
company in the Middle East the Bin Laden Group was planning a jihad against all 
Americans.  His hatred for westerners in particular Americans can be traced to the 
removal of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the continued American presence in the 
Middle East after the liberation of Kuwait.  To fundamentalists like Bin Laden the 
presence of non-Muslims in the two holiest sites of Mecca and Medina was 
incomprehensible.  Bin Laden clearly expresses these feelings in a 1998 interview for 
ABC News: 
 
"Allah ordered us in this region to purify the Muslim land of all non-
believers and especially in the Arabian Peninsula... We believe that the 
biggest thieves in the world and the terrorists are the Americans ... We 
do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and 
civilians; they are all targets in this Fatwa (religious ruling)." (Miller) 
 
Despite attacks on the World Trade Center (truck bomb ‘93), American embassies in 
Tanzania and Kenya, the Al-Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the USS COLE 
Americans at the very highest level of government did not comprehend the global reach 
capability of Bin Laden’s organization.  The United States on September 10th had a very 
loose attitude toward homeland security much of which continued to be based on a Cold 
War position.   
 
This attitude would change drastically on September 11th, 2001.  These most horrific of 
attacks would forever change the lives of nearly all Americans.  Some of the more easily 
linked results of the attacks are the war on terrorism and America’s firm stance related to 
homeland security but this event touched much more than that to include the construction 
industry.  The attacks had an immediate and forever lasting impact on the construction 
industry.   
 
When American Airline flight 77 hit the Pentagon it left a wake of destruction in its path 
that was incomprehensible to those that worked there.  Not only were 184 individuals 
killed at the Pentagon that day but the tip of America’s military spear had been badly 
damaged.  With a renovation project already ongoing the importance of which increased 
ten-fold.  Following the attacks contractors quickly moved to restore the facility’s full 
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 capability, this action was critical to the ongoing execution of military operations 
throughout the world. 
 
The focus of this paper will be on some of the more subtle impacts that the attacks have 
had on project management and the construction industry.  Every construction project has 
a project life cycle.  This paper will break the project lifecycle down into three phases 
Initiation, Design, and Procurement / Construction.  For each of these phases it will 
examine the impact terrorism has had on it and what these impacts may hold for the 
future.   
 




Procurement / Construction 
Phase  
 
Figure 1.1: Project Life Cycle to include Security Review                                                  
(Courtesy of FEMA 427 Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attack p. 6-17)                                       
The figure above shows the three phases of a project life cycle and what actions are 
occurring in each of those phases.  It also shows, that at the earliest stages of project 
development concerns with respect to terrorism and security are part of the project 
planning and must continue throughout the life of the project.  
The Initiation Phase will look at the impact on what projects are being funded today as a 
result of the attacks.  There are sectors of the construction industries such as force 
protection specialists whose workloads have increased exponentially since 9/11.  In 
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 addition, there are other impacts to this phase such as how contracts are structured to 
protect the interests of certain contractual parties. 
 
In the Design Phase we’ll review the changes that are being incorporated into building 
design to help mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack.  Often looked at as being to costly 
to incorporate considering the risk, many new high visibility projects are including design 
modifications to increase the survivability of the building patrons.  The excuse used in 
the past that an attack will never happen here in the United States is no longer valid.  
Both public and private organizations are feeling the need to protect their workers. 
 
The Procurement / Construction Phase has also seen changes as a result of the events of 
9/11.  In the federal government there was an immediate reaction to improve the security 
surrounding many of its facilities.  The fastest method to accomplish this was not using 
some of the more traditional contractual approaches rather to use procurement strategies 
such as design-build which allow projects to be fast tracked.  Also, stemming from this 
was a sharp increase in secured construction.  This increase brought about the need for 
more contractors to have the capability to perform secured facility construction which 
presents unique challenges often not considered on normal unsecured construction.  
 
There is no doubt that the 9/11 terrorist attacks have impacted many industries 
throughout the United States.  The construction industry like many others is certainly 
operating under a different set of pretenses that could have never been conceived by the 
average American prior to the attacks.  Both public and private projects have been 
impacted but even four years removed from the attacks the long-term impacts have yet to 

















The start to all construction projects is the initiation phase.  This phase begins with the 
owner, either a corporation or government body, recognizing the need for a facility to 
meet a specific need or requirement.  Private corporations are often driven by economic 
factors which decide what facilities are necessary to allow expansion in business 
activities.  Conversely, government bodies often use different criteria having more to do 
with meeting the needs of its constituents.   
 
This initial phase is the first of several “go / no go” decision points.  At each of these 
decision points the owner must determine if the project is still required given the data 
which has been collected.  The impact of terrorism has generated a huge workload for the 
construction industry.  Projects which were being cancelled because the owner felt the 
money could be better spent elsewhere are now at the forefront.  The reason for this 
change in attitude is directly related to terrorism and the new perceived threat here within 
the borders of the United States.  Despite the earlier terrorist attacks of the 90’s the 
attitude of Americans which was reflected in the government was that terrorism is an 
overseas problem not a homeland security issue.  For that reason the government was 
spending money overseas to improve the security at U.S. embassies and military 
installations but was not spending any money within the U.S. to protect its borders.  
Following the attacks of 9/11 there was a huge shift in this attitude toward homeland 
security. 
 
2.2 NEW PROJECT DEMANDS 
 
New project demands have been created as a result of terrorist activity.  The resulting 
projects are in a wide variety of areas and have created a significant opportunity for 
contractors and design professionals. 
 
2.2.1  Utilities: Water, Power and Pipelines 
Congress has required every community water system serving more than 3,300 persons to 
conduct an assessment of its vulnerability to a terrorist attack.  For large systems (those 
involving populations of 100,000 or more), such assessments were required to have been 
completed by March 31, 2003.  Medium-sized systems (serving populations of 50,000 to 
100,000) were required to be completed by December 31, 2003.  All others covered by 
the law must be completed by June 30, 2004 (De Van). 
Congress also has appropriated funds to upgrade community water systems to make them 
less vulnerable to attack.  The type of work which resulted from the review included 
purchasing security systems (such as fencing) and making certain system components 
tamper-proof. 
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 The vulnerability of our power grid was clearly demonstrated by the Northeast blackout 
in 2003.  Thankfully this condition was not as a result of terrorism but it did show the 
devastating impact this condition can have on a region.  New York City saw its public 
transportation fail, water supplies impacted, cell phones shutdown, and the closing of 
major financial institutions to include the stock exchange.  
As a result the electric power industry has initiated programs to increase security.  The 
Nuclear Regulatory Agency is assessing reactor vulnerabilities.  The North American 
Electric Reliability Council recently hosted a conference to explore conventional power 
plant vulnerabilities.  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has proposed 
regulations relating to cyber-security for the electrical grid (De Van).  As these programs 
progress, new standards will evolve, and numerous plants will need to be upgraded. 
In 2002, Congress also enacted the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act (P.L. 107-355), 
which requires the Departments of Transportation and Energy, together with other 
agencies, to use their expertise in consultation with industry representatives to carry out a 
program of research, development and standardization regarding pipeline safety           
(De Van).  One aspect of the research is finding ways to improve and standardize security 
against terrorist threats.  The initiative seems certain to lead to increased spending by 
pipeline owners. 
2.2.2  Transportation 
While airport security has gotten the most public attention, the construction industry 
likely will be more affected by provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 (MTSA).  As with water systems, MTSA requires a vulnerability assessment for 
each port. This assessment, however, is to be conducted by the Coast Guard.  Once the 
assessment is completed, the Department of Transportation can grant up to 75 percent of 
the cost of making improvements to ports to secure them from terrorist attack.  
Unfortunately, Congress has yet to fully fund this program, but the current cost estimate 
for completing the assessments and upgrades is $7.9 billion over the next 10 years (De 
Van). 
2.2.3  Secure Facility Construction 
The construction of secure facilities has recently become a reenergized form of 
construction.  During the Cold War of the 50’s and 60’s bomb shelter were built across 
America by individuals and local and national governments to protect citizens and critical 
government assets against a possible nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.  Today the 
construction of these facilities has begun again with the threat spectrum expanded from 
not only nuclear devices but also chemical, biological and other unconventional weapon 
systems.  The possibility of a rogue nation launching a nuclear warhead against the 
Washington, DC metropolitan area is still a concern but there are additional threats to 
include the possibility of a terrorist group using smaller, difficult to detect, mobile 
weapons platforms to strike.  The desire of such organizations is often to inflict the most 
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 damage to create hysteria as was seen in New York City and Washington, DC area during 
and immediately following the attacks on 9/11. 
The construction of bunkers to support critical government functions became well known 
during World War II when Hitler operated from his Berlin bunker in the final days of the 
Third Reich.  One of America’s most famous bunkers which had been exposed in the last 
10 years was the congressional bunker located at the Greenbrier Resort in White Sulpher 
Springs, West Virginia.  Located roughly five hours southwest of Washington, DC the 
truly amazing construction feat accomplished is the fact that in 1960 a facility which 
required over 4,000 truckloads of concrete over a two and one half year period in the 
middle of rural West Virginia was able to be built without exposure by the media and the 
community (Gup).  The facility which has walls two feet thick and buried 20 feet below 
grade contained an infirmary, sleeping quarters, kitchen, television studio, generators 
capable to supply all power requirements, and assembly rooms which were strategically 
located to allow there unsuspected use during normal resort operations.  The resort 
employed maintenance workers who held a normal hotel staff repairmen position but who 
also had additional responsibilities to maintain and operate the facility.  The secrecy of 
construction and operation of such a facility allowed it to by ready and waiting in the 
event of a national attack for over 30 years. 
During the terrorist attacks on 9/11 the President was at a Florida Elementary School and 
the Vice President was at the White House.  Following the second plane striking the 
World Trade Center the Secret Service relocated Vice President Cheney to the 
underground White House shelter (CNN.COM).  The location of this bunker was 
unknown to most but became an essential operation center from which the Vice President 
made critical decision throughout the day.  In addition, helicopters landed at the capitol as 
essential government staff were taken to undisclosed locations to ensure continuity of 
government.  It was the feeling of vulnerability experienced by those individuals in 
Washington, DC and New York which has once again generated interest in constructing 
and modifying exiting protective shelters to match the threat in the post Cold War era.  
Much like the secrecy which surrounded the Greenbrier construction in the early 60’s, 
facilities are being constructed across America today to protect vital government 
interests.  The true extent and costs of such construction probably will never be known.  
The fact is the support of the engineering and construction industry is critical to 
maintaining a government which is prepared to operate under the most difficult 
conditions. 
2.2.4  Anti-Terrorism Force Protection  
Anti-Terrorism Force Protection has always been a concern most specifically for military 
installations around the world.  Recent terrorist activities have resulted in a real focus in 
this area for all armed services’ facility program managers.  The applicable Department 
of Defense (DoD) instruction states: 
6 
     "DoD Antiterrorism Standards," requires DoD Components to 
adopt and adhere to common criteria and minimum construction 
standards to mitigate antiterrorism vulnerabilities and terrorist 
threats. The philosophy behind these building standards is to build 
greater resistance to a terrorist attack into all inhabited buildings. 
That philosophy affects the general practice of designing inhabited 
buildings. While these standards are not based on a known threat, 
they are intended to provide the easiest and most economical 
methods to minimize injuries and fatalities in the event of a 
terrorist attack. The primary strategies to achieve this outcome are 
to maximize standoff distance, to construct superstructures to 
avoid progressive collapse, to reduce flying debris hazards, to 
provide effective building layout, to limit airborne contamination, 
and to provide mass notification. These and related design issues 
are intended to be incorporated into standard design practices, and 
facilitate future requirements in a dynamic threat environment. 
(UFC 4-010-01)  
Final standards have been developed by the DoD Security Engineer Working Group and 
were approved by the DoD Engineering Senior Executive Panel on Oct 8, 2003.  These 
standards are not based on a specific threat, but are intended to provide the easiest and 
most economical methods to minimize injuries and fatalities in the event of a terrorist 
attack. 
Requirements for ATFP standards in DoD construction are included in construction 
programming documents in accordance with DoD guidance.  Incorporating ATFP 
standards into new buildings where required standoff distances are available increases 
construction cost by three to five percent (UFC 4-010-01).  Costs vary considerably 
where sufficient standoff is not available or when upgrading existing buildings.  Site and 
interior building layout are low/no cost means to meet requirements.  Cost increases are 
generally based on upgraded windows, structural detailing for the prevention of 
progressive collapse, and modifications of the building interior to minimize hazardous 
flying debris. 
The importance of AFTP measures and the funding currently being spent has resulted in 
contractors and designers who specialize in force protection assessments and corrective 
measures.  This sector of work has greatly expanded over the past several years and will 
continue to be a strong industry to be working in the foreseeable future. 
Infrastructure, transportation, secure facilities and AFTP are just a couple of the many 
areas whose construction workload has expanded exponentially since 9/11.  The 
workload is only expected to increase as more and more facilities perform surveys to 
examine vulnerabilities resulting in retrofitting current facilities with the proper 
protection or constructing new facilities with improved safeties in design.  Either way 
design and construction will remain strong in this field. 
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 2.3 CONTRACTUAL IMPACTS 
During the initiation phase there is a large amount of information that the owner must 
consider when deciding whether to continue with a project.  One of the most important, if 
not the most important, items to look at is the financial status of the project.  Owners both 
public and private must ensure that the cost to perform the project is necessary to meet an 
established objective.  The cost breakdown at this early phase of the project is a rough 
estimate with a rough order of magnitude for design and construction estimates as well as 
costs associated with the financing the project.   
The process of reviewing inputs to make the “go / no go” decision is never an easy tasks.  
Nearly every choice which is made has a direct impact on the bottom line cost of a 
project.  The addition of risk as a result of terrorist activity has only complicated this 
process.  Several additional contractual responsibilities must be considered given the 
current state of world affairs and the possibility of additional attacks. 
2.3.1  Force Majeure Clause  
The following clause was pulled from the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR): 
Excusable delays - The Contractor shall be liable for default unless 
nonperformance is caused by an occurrence beyond the reasonable 
control of the Contractor and without its fault or negligence such 
as, acts of God or the public enemy, acts of the Government in either 
its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, 
quarantine restrictions, strikes, unusually severe weather, and delays of 
common carriers. 
This clause is associated with those acts which are out of the control of the contractor 
such as fires or floods.  The question becomes are terrorist attacks considered an act of 
war or public enemy.  The courts have suggested through case law (Pan American World 
Airways, Inc v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.) that such acts are not considered acts of 
war and therefore not considered an excusable delays. 
The government took a different approach at the Pentagon crash site.  The Pentagon is 
undergoing a major renovation project and in fact the wedge where the plane hit was 
nearing completion and tenants had begun to move back into spaces.  Fortunately at this 
location the structure had been reinforced and fire sprinklers installed which limited the 
overall damage to the facility.  In accordance with case law and the clause listed above if 
the government had not accepted ownership of the newly completed wedge then the 
contractor would have no recourse to pursue for costs and time to reconstruct all that was 
damaged.  But, given the importance of the facility from a national security standpoint as 
well as from a public confidence standpoint it was critical for the federal government not 
to place this heavy burden on the contractor.   
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 The idea of contractors not being protected by this clause is a large risk for the contractor 
in relation to project schedules.  A solution for contractors is to have language written 
into the contract which specifically refers to acts of terrorism.  Though this may not have 
been and issue on the Pentagon project if there was a smaller attack against say a non-
government agency the owner may not be so understandable and the contractor legally 
could be held to the original project timeline. 
2.3.2  Insurance    
The previous clause discussed an excusable delay related to time only and having nothing 
to do with costs which are often an even bigger concern to the contractor.  The costs of 
reconstruction after an attack could more than double the cost of a project.  The 
contractors would have no alternative but to try to pass the increased costs on to 
insurance companies through their general liability coverage.  This coverage is essentially 
property insurance for the construction site while it is under the control of the contractor.  
Where the excusable delay clause protects the contractor on a time basis from fire, floods, 
etc., the general liability insurance policy protects them on a cost basis.  A contractor 
would use this coverage if for example a project site was hit by a voltage spike resulting 
in a fire which caused severe damage to the facility under construction.  The contractor 
could recover the cost to make the necessary repairs to the site to bring it back to the state 
it was in prior to the event occurring. 
As a result of 9/11, the insurance industry incurred an estimated $40.2 billion in 
associated losses. In reaction to these losses, insurers quickly revised coverage for risks 
associated with terrorism.  Many insurers added terrorism exclusions to both pre-existing 
and new policies, and those that continued to provide coverage did so under substantially 
higher premiums.  In response, and in an effort to temporarily ensure the ability of 
businesses and individuals to obtain property and casualty insurance at reasonable prices, 
as well as the ability of the insurance industry to cover unprecedented financial risks 
while developing private terrorism risk insurance, the United States Congress enacted the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) (Hannah).  
TRIA, which became effective November 26, 2002 and is effective through December 
31, 2005, establishes a temporary federal program under which the federal government 
shares with the private insurance industry the risk and compensation for future "acts of 
terrorism," as defined by TRIA.  Under the law the federal government covers 90 percent 
of the losses above a company’s deductible, while the insurers provide the remaining 10 
percent (Hannah).  Nearly every insurer who offers commercial property and casualty 
insurance policies, including worker's compensation policies, must participate in the 
Program and offer coverage for "acts of terrorism."  As of November 26, 2002, all policy 
exclusions that excluded coverage for losses resulting from "acts of terrorism" were 
voided and such losses became covered under the Program upon the policyholder's 
acceptance of related premiums.  In order to be able to participate in the Program, 
insurers were required, as of February 24, 2003, to "clearly and conspicuously" disclose 
to policyholders the premium charged for these now covered losses (Hannah).  
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 Although TRIA requires insurers to offer coverage for "acts of terrorism," policyholders 
are not required to purchase it, and in fact many policyholders have thus far opted not to 
do so.  Many are not due to the extremely high premiums and the fact that policyholders 
do not believe they are exposed to particularly high risk for terrorism-related losses.  
Limitations on the available coverage play an additional role in many decisions to forego 
coverage.  In order for an "act of terrorism" to be covered under the Program, it must be 
committed by a foreign person or interest and result in greater than $5 million in damage. 
Domestic acts of terrorism and destruction committed in the course of war are not 
covered.  Any act must be certified as an "act of terrorism" by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Attorney General in order for resulting 
losses to be covered. This limitation makes policyholders wary, even more so because 
certification of an act as an "act of terrorism" covered under the Program is a 
determination which is not subject to judicial review (Hannah).  
Whether to purchase terrorism coverage is a business decision, based on risk 
management principles. Currently, most businesses are foregoing terrorism coverage, 
either refusing -- or unable -- to pay for coverage that can increase premiums by up to 
200 percent, and in extreme cases, by as much as 2,000 percent (Hannah).  In the end, 
those businesses that are buying terrorism coverage seem to be doing so only because 
their lenders require it.  
Although the Program is only in its early stages of implementation, it does not appear that 
all of TRIA's goals are being met.  In the absence of state regulation of insurance 
premiums, insurers can charge as much as they wish for terrorism coverage.  The 
unregulated cost of terrorism coverage continues to be higher than most businesses and 
individuals are willing or able to pay.  Because risk is not being spread over a large 
number of policyholders, premiums remain high.  Only time will tell if this will change, 
depending on whether insurers learn how to price this risk and whether the threat of 
terrorism escalates, diminishes or stabilizes.  For now, TRIA provides little actual relief 
in terms of ensuring the coverage is readily available to protect against terrorism related 
losses. 
2.4 OVERALL IMPACT 
This section looked at the impact terrorism has had on the initiation phase of a project 
lifecycle.  It can be seen that certain sectors of the trade most notably AFTP has received 
a substantial influx in funding and as a result there are many public and private projects 
to either establish or improve facility security.  Meanwhile, the construction industry has 
a whole has taken a turn downward since the attack.  The industry data shows a decrease 
by 2.6 percent in 2002 and 0.3 percent in 2003 when comparing by industry its 
contribution to the gross domestic product.  These numbers are made worse by the fact 
that from 1995 – 2000 the construction industry had been increasing on average by about 
3 percent (Bureau of Economic Analysis).  Knowing this information it’s essential for 
companies to understand the changing face of the construction industry and develop a 
plan which ensures they are prepared to take part in the change. 
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 The other important item to note is that there are new concerns contractors and owners 
must have when entering into a contract which probably would not have been an issue 
before.  That is the risk of additional attacks and how that risk will be shared between 
owner, contractor and insurer.  The insurance industry took a large hit because of 9/11 as 
a result the federal government stepped in to help in accepting some of the risk.  The risk 
of attack and how it will be allocated must now become part of the initial project decision 
making process. 
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 CHAPTER 3  DESIGN PHASE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Most fundamentally, owners, designers and contractors now will be held to a higher 
standard of care in performing their work.  Negligence is the failure to use such care as a 
reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances to prevent 
harm to others.  As a general rule, reasonableness is determined by foreseeability -- i.e., 
what a reasonably prudent person could be expected to foresee as a possible consequence 
of his or her acts or omissions.  Until 9/11, no reasonable person could have foreseen an 
event involving the coordinated highjackings of four airliners for the sole purpose of 
flying them into landmark buildings such as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 
After 9/11 experience requires us to contemplate just such an attack. 
Fast on the heels of 9/11, an unidentified person or group mailed a series of letters 
containing anthrax to members of Congress.  These letters contaminated congressional 
offices, the postal facility where the letters were sorted and cross-contaminated other mail 
processed through the postal facility.  This bio-terrorist attack killed several postal 
workers, and the cross-contaminated mail randomly infected scores of other mail 
recipients.  Yet again, what was once unforeseeable has become foreseeable. 
3.2 NEW DESIGN REQUIRMENTS 
Because such acts now are foreseeable owners, designers and contractors arguably have a 
duty to take the possibility of terrorist attacks into consideration when designing new 
projects.  To stop a terrorist physical attack on a building is very difficult; any building or 
site can be breached or destroyed.  However, the more secure the building or site and the 
better the building is designed to withstand an attack, the better the odds the building will 
not be attacked or, if attacked, will suffer less damage.  There are two parameters which 
define the design threat: the weapon size, measured in equivalent pounds of TNT, and the 
standoff.  The standoff is the distance measured from the center of gravity of the charge 
to the facility of interest.  The following information looks at design criteria developed to 
help in protecting a facility against a terrorist attack.  
3.2.1  Evaluation Procedure 
Part of the design review process for each new project of any significance should include 
some evaluation of the potential terrorist threats to that project.  Considerations that 
should be taken into account include: 
• Whether the project has any landmark significance, i.e., does the project have 
sufficient symbolic significance to merit terrorist attention? 
• Will the project have a government tenant and what is there mission? 
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 • Will an attack on the project have a significant ripple effect on the economy or a 
region?  For example, a pipeline could pose a more attractive target than a 
warehouse because an attack on a pipeline could affect millions of people and the 
entire economy while an attack on a warehouse might affect only a few people. 
• Would an attack on the facility have a secondary physical impact?  For example, 
an attack on chemical plant could release a toxic plume killing or injuring 
thousands of people. 
• Is the project near an attractive terrorist target?  Recall that many neighboring 
buildings were damaged in the World Trade Center attack. (FEMA 427) 
Once the potential threats have been identified, designers should take into consideration 
features necessary to eliminate or mitigate the loss from an attack.  While it may not be 
possible to design a building to withstand the impact of a Boeing 767 loaded with jet fuel, 
it may be possible to mitigate the impact by adding more stairwells than required by code 
or bridging twin towers (as in the Petronas Towers) so that tenants can move to another 
structure if their escape route is cut off.  Similarly, if the project is near a chemical plant, 
prudence may require that the ventilation systems be designed to allow for the filtering of 
toxic chemicals released in an attack. 
Any determination of what a reasonably prudent person should do to guard against a 
terrorist attack must be made on a case-by-case basis factoring in the use of the facility, 
the surrounding circumstances, regulations particularly applicable to the project and, of 
course, costs. 
3.2.2  Site Planning 
The primary design strategy if afforded the opportunity of placing the location of a 
building is to incorporate a proper standoff distance.  The benefit to a proper standoff 
distance is it cost nothing to implement (assuming building location has sufficient space) 
and because air-blast pressure decreases rapidly with distance it is one of the most 
effective means of protecting facilities.  The best way to accomplish this is to provide a 
continuous line of security along the perimeter of the facility to protect it from 
unscreened vehicles.  The distance from the facility to the security line can vary by 
facility, location, risk, and threat.  In suburban areas, 100ft is considered a desirable 
standoff distance, although this is often unrealistic in urban settings (FEMA 427).  The 
standoff zone can also be combined with other devices such as bollards, plaza setbacks, 
landscaping, trees and boulders to restrict vehicular access.  
3.2.3  Physical Protective Barriers 
Passive barrier systems are those which are fixed in place and do not allow vehicle 
access.  Examples of such barriers are large planters, bollards, or knee walls.  These 
barriers must be constructed to be as high as a vehicle bumper which is between two to 
three feet and of sufficient weight or depth to prevent movement in the event of a vehicle 
collision.  At vehicle access points active anti-ram systems must be used.  These systems 
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 which require an operator are designed to resist various levels of car and truck impacts.  
These systems are often composed of crash gates, retractable bollards, or rotating-wedge 
systems.  There are several factors to consider when installing these systems to include 
architectural concerns, manning requirements, and underground conflicts which can 
direct which type of system is installed.  
3.2.4  Building Exterior 
The focus of a building exterior is not on deterring or delaying an attack instead its 
purpose is to mitigate damage resulting from a blast.  The choice of exterior material is 
important for several reasons: it’s the portion of the building closest to the blast, it’s often 
made from brittle materials which can fragment, and is a critical barrier between 
occupants and the blast (FEMA 427).  Another important factor to consider is the 
building shape which can have a contributing effect on the overall damage to the 
structure.  Overhangs and re-entrant corners are likely to trap blast waves having an 
amplifying effect.  Generally simple geometries with minimal ornamentation (which can 
become flying projectiles in a blast) are recommended unless advanced structural 
analysis is performed.  The types of ornamentation recommended if used are lightweight 
materials such as timber or plastic, which are less likely to become lethal projectiles 
when compared to brick, stone, or metal. 
Windows are typically the most vulnerable portion of any building.  Though it may be 
impractical to design all the windows to resist a large scale explosive attack, it is 
desirable to limit the amount of hazardous glass breakage to reduce the injuries.  Typical 
annealed glass windows break at low pressure and impulse levels and the shards created 
by broken windows are responsible for many of the injuries incurred during a large-scale 
explosive attack.  In designing windows to mitigate the effects of explosions they should 
first be designed to resist conventional loads and then be checked for explosive load 
effects.  The glass is designed to be no stronger than the weakest part of the overall 
window system (frame, anchorage, and supporting wall system).  If the glass is stronger 
than the supporting members, then the window is likely to fail with the whole panel 
entering into the building as a single unit, possibly with the frame, anchorage, and the 
wall attached.  Using this approach allows the extent of collateral damage to be 
controlled. 
3.2.5  Building Interior       
The functional layout on the interior of a building has a huge impact on the overall 
security of a facility.  As shown in Figure 2 below, unsecured areas such as lobbies, 
loading docks, mail rooms, garages, and retail areas should be separated from secured 
areas of the facility.  Ideally these areas would be located outside the main footprint of 
the secured building.  This is of particular importance when looking at vehicle parking 
areas as a truck or car bombs placed within the building footprint has a much higher 
probability of resulting in a catastrophic building collapse.  If this separation cannot be 
made then the next best approach is to look at unsecured and secured area within the 
building itself.  Unsecured areas should be placed to the exterior of the building and 
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 should not be above or below secured / critical areas.  The lobby area should be large 
enough to allow proper screening (if necessary) of personnel out of the weather when 
entering the building and the design should minimize exposed structural columns in such 
unsecured areas.  Internal elevator shafts should be placed away from parking areas, 
loading docks, and vehicle access points.  These shafts can become chimneys and send 
smoke and heat from the explosion to all levels of the building.  Smoke inhalation was 
the most common medical injury which resulted from the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing due to the elevators venting smoke throughout the building.  Finally, the 
placement of workstations should be as far from exterior windows as practical with 
monitors being orientated away from the windows to prevent injury due to impact from a 
monitor (FEMA 427). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Improved Building Layout                                                                            
(Courtesy of FEMA 427 Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attack p. 6-10) 
3.2.6  Structural 
The World Trade Center collapse brought to everyone’s attention the engineering 
principle of progressive collapse.  Progressive collapse occurs when a structure has its 
loading pattern, or boundary conditions changed such that structural elements are loaded 
beyond their capacity and fail.  The residual structure is forced to seek alternative load 
paths to redistribute the load applied to it. As a result, other elements may fail, causing 
further load redistribution. The process will continue until the structure can find 
equilibrium either by shedding load, as a by-product of other elements failing, or by 
finding stable alternative load paths (FEMA 427).  Because of the catastrophic 
consequences of progressive collapse, incorporating these measures into the overall 
15 
 building design should be given the highest priority when considering structural design 
approaches for mitigating the effects of attacks. 
 
Historically, the preferred material for explosion-mitigating construction is cast-in-place 
reinforced concrete.  This is the material used for military bunkers, and the military has 
performed extensive research and testing of its performance.  Reinforced concrete has a 
number of attributes that make it the construction material of choice.  It has significant 
mass, which improves response to explosions.  Members can be readily proportioned and 
reinforced for ductile behavior.  The construction is unparalleled in its ability to achieve 
continuity between the members.  Finally, concrete columns are less susceptible to global 
buckling in the event of the loss of a floor system (FEMA 427).  Testing programs are 
investigating the effectiveness of various other building systems and materials but to date 
none prove to provide the level of protection as achieved with cast-in-place reinforced 
concrete. 
 
3.2.7  Mechanical and Electrical Systems 
 
The key concepts for providing secure and effective mechanical and electrical systems in 
a building are the same as for other building systems: separation, hardening, and 
redundancy.  Keeping critical mechanical and electrical functions as far from high-threat 
areas as possible (i.e. lobbies, garages, and retail spaces) increases their ability to survive 
an event.  Separation is perhaps the most cost-effective option.  Additionally, physical 
hardening or protection of these systems provides increased likelihood that they will be 
able to survive the direct effects of the event.  Finally, by providing redundant emergency 
systems that are adequately separated, there is a greater likelihood that emergency 
systems will remain operational post-event to assist rescuers in the evacuation of the 
building. 
 
Structurally, the walls and floor systems adjacent to the areas where critical equipment is 
located need to be protected by means of hardening.  Other areas where hardening is 
recommended include primary egress routes, feeders for emergency power distribution, 
sprinkler systems, fire alarm system wiring, and ducts used for smoke-control systems 
(FEMA 427).  From an operational security standpoint, it is important to restrict and 
control access to air-intake louvers, mechanical and electrical rooms, telecommunication 
spaces and rooftops.  An emergency generator should be provided as an alternate source 
of power should utility power become unavailable to critical life-safety systems such as 
alarm systems, egress lighting fixtures, exit signs, emergency communications systems, 
smoke-control equipment, and fire pumps. 
   
3.2.8  Developing Technologies 
 
The development of new technology to support building safety has always been 
important.  But given the current world conditions it has taken on a new sense of urgency.  
There are a wide variety of areas which are currently being studied to help designers and 
contractors build the most cost effective secure facility given the risk.  Here are a few of 
the areas currently being studied (NIST):  
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• Increasing Structural Integrity - Structural integrity will be increased through the 
development and implementation of performance criteria for codes and standards, 
tools and practical guidance for prevention of progressive structural collapse.  
System design concepts, retarded collapse mechanisms, built in redundancy, and 
hardening structures though retrofit are being considered.   
 
• Enhancing Fire Resistance - Fire resistant steels exist and are in use elsewhere in 
the world.  More efficient and accurate tests for performance of steels under 
building fire conditions are needed and are being developed to help industry 
incorporate fire resistant steels into U.S. construction practice. 
 
• Improving Emergency Egress and Access - By working with the primary 
stakeholders (elevator and construction industries, fire services, professional 
societies and code making bodies), the role of elevators in providing access by the 
fire service to a fire in a high rise building is being greatly enhanced over current 
practice.  The development of hardened fire service elevators and new emergency 
operation procedures/controls will also lead to improved egress capabilities from 
tall buildings, especially for mobility-impaired or injured occupants.    
 
• Developing Building and Emergency Equipment Standards and Guidelines - 
Partnering with ASHRAE and other federal agencies, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology developed indoor air quality simulation tools extended 
to analyze and guide the assessment and subsequent reductions in the 
vulnerability of buildings to chemical, biological, radiological aerosols.  A user-
friendly tool is being developed for building owners and managers to aid in the 
selection of cost-effective strategies for the management of terrorist and 
environmental risks.    
3.3 OVERALL IMPACT 
This section looked at the impact terrorism has had on the design phase of a project 
lifecycle.  As a result of 9/11 more and more owners are concerned about the security of 
their facilities.  With the wide range of terrorist threats against everything from schools to 
financial institutions it’s important that more and more public and private owners 
incorporate security measures into their designs.  Designers are quickly realizing the 
importance of these measures and if included early in the design the cost impacts can be 
minimized.  Ultimately it is decided by the owner if he or she wants to fund the increased 
security measures.  There are many options and degrees of protection but the important 





 CHAPTER 4  PROCUREMENT / CONSTRUCTION PHASE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Soon after the design phase has been completed the owner will procure construction 
services to perform the work.  There are several different approaches an owner can take 
to obtain these services.  The first method that could be used is the tradition method of 
design-bid-build.  With this method the owner hires an architect / engineer to design the 
project and then takes the completed drawings to hire a contractor to perform the work.  
Another option is professional construction management which treats the project 
planning, design, and construction phases as integrated tasks.  This approach creates a 
three party team consisting of owner, designer, and construction manager in a non-
adversary relationship, and it provides the owner with the opportunity to participate fully 
in the construction process.  The final option is design-build where the designer and 
builder are a team working together with only one contract with the owner.  The design 
build option has become a popular approach to contracting to include projects similar in 
nature to those presented earlier.  This section will examine why this approach works for 
these project types as well as look at the challenges these projects present to the 
contractor.  
4.2 PROJECT DELIVERY STRATEGIES 
During the life of a project there are many decisions and challenges that are encountered.  
It is the team of owner, designer, and contractor which must be working in harmony to 
get the best result possible.  This section will look at some of the decisions and 
challenges which are presented to this team while performing projects with special 
requirements such as those presented earlier. 
 
4.2.1  Design-Build 
 
Many factors go into choosing the type of delivery method to be used to perform a 
project.  The three most common methods are the traditional method (design-bid-build), 
professional construction management method, and design-build method.  Though each 
of these methods has their own advantages and disadvantages the design-build method is 
probably the one best suited for this type of work.  Listed below are some advantages to 
this approach and how that correlates to improving projects of this nature.   
 
• There is only one contract for the owner to manage to include both the designer 
and contractor.  It creates a one stop shop for the owner to ask either design or 
construction related questions.  It also creates a better working relationship with 
all parties involved in the project which reduces the risk of litigation. 
 
This type of arrangement is important to the owner for a couple reasons.  These 
projects are often unique in nature with unique requirements.  The structures 
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 being built may be one of a kind or remotely located so having the designer and 
contractor on the same team greatly reduces communication challenges between 
the two teams given the unusually difficult nature of the work.  It’s also important 
to develop a team approach to projects such as these.  Given the importance of the 
decisions being made it’s critical that all sides are freely communicating.  The 
added benefit to the owner is that a heavy emphasis is put on the designer and 
contractor to resolve problems without the owner having to be involved which 
tends to minimize the number of design discrepancy change orders. 
 
• Can be fast tracked through a phased construction approach.   
 
The design-build approach major advantage is that it allows the contractor to 
begin work prior to the design being completed.  This was very important for 
certain projects immediately following 9/11.  First, this ability to immediately 
mobilize a design / contractor team soon after the attacks demonstrating progress 
was critical in showing key government leadership that actions were being taken 
to protect government continuity during this time of great uncertainty.  Secondly, 
by starting the construction prior to a completed design the project can be 
completed earlier thus allowing the owner to utilize these facilities much faster 
than if other delivery methods were chosen.         
 
• Considerable opportunity for the contractor to become involved during the 
planning and designing phase.  This can pay huge dividends in both time and 
money. 
 
Due to the nature of this work sometimes being “one of kind” type construction it 
is important to have the contractor involved earlier to be part of the design 
process.  The contractor is able to interject ideas in design review meetings as 
well as review schematic designs from a constructability standpoint that design 
engineers just don’t have the field experience to perform.  This early involvement 
is a huge time savings and allows the contractor to price design options more on 




• Probably the easiest method to incorporate changes because the designer and 
contractor are working so closely. 
 
Changes are an unavoidable part of construction.  For this reason it’s important 
that the system is able to quickly respond to all forms of changes from customer 
requested to design omissions.  The design-build method has the flexibility to 
quickly react as a result of the designer and contractor being part of the same team 
with both having a financial incentive to rectify changes.  
 
With any method used in contracting there are always disadvantages which must be 
recognized and dealt with.  The key is to understand these disadvantages, how they 
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 impact the project being performed, and have contingency plans to deal these challenges.  
Below are several disadvantages to this contracting method: 
 
• There are no firm project costs prior to the start of the project.  The owner is not 
afforded the “go / no go” decision based on total project costs prior to the start of 
construction. 
 
This is a risk that the owner takes when entering into this type of delivery method.  
If project cost is secondary to project execution then this may not be an issue but 
for many projects the cost of completion is instrumental in the decision process.  
If the scope of work is clearly defined early then a reasonable estimate can be 
made.  The problem becomes as a project progresses and cost escalate how does 
the project team keep the budget in check.  There are a several options available 
to the team such as reducing quality, cutting scope, or removing some of the 
building safeties discussed in this paper.  Removing such safeties increases the 
owner’s exposure to risk but that is a decision that will have to be well thought 
out by the owner.  
 
• There are few checks and balances and the owner is sometimes not advised or 
aware of design or construction problems that may greatly affect cost or schedule. 
 
In other delivery methods there is a natural tendency for the designer to keep the 
contractor in check as well as the contractor to watch the designer with the owner 
somewhere in the middle.  Under this arrangement the designer and contractor are 
one and the same from the owner’s perspective so there aren’t necessarily those 
same checks and balances.  For that reason the owner can either put all their faith 
in the design-build team, use knowledgeable in-house assets to oversee 
construction, or hire an independent third party.  This decision by the owner is 
based on the type of construction and the level of comfort with the design-build 
team.  Given the sensitivity of many of these types of a project it is advisable that 
the owner use independent oversight either in-house or third party to supervise the 
project.   
 
• The speed of execution of this method can be fast so the owner must be 
knowledgeable and involved to ensure project objectives are met. 
 
A positive as well as a negative is the speed at which these types of projects can 
be completed.  Understanding this, the owner needs to be prepared to make 
necessary decisions with more speed than when compared to say the traditional 
method.  The speed at which these decisions are made will greatly impact the 
overall construction schedule.  
4.3 CONTRACTOR CONSIDERATIONS 
Construction is a planning intensive process.  Plans must be comprehensive and complete 
to ensure that contractors don’t miss anything in bids or schedules.  The failure to account 
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 for a major work activity could result in poor performance or even worse bankruptcy.  
For this reason contractors are very good at building work plans.  On a secure project 
there are sometimes different challenges which aren’t seen on typical construction 
projects.  The items listed below are just a few of the additional activities that must be 
accounted for in a work plan.   
4.3.1  Clearances 
Many of these projects present unique and unusual challenges to the contractor not seen 
on typical construction projects.  These challenges can have huge impacts on both cost 
and schedule so it is very important that the contractor takes these items into account 
when presenting estimates.  It is a contractor’s ability to overcome these challenges 
which will determine the success of a project. 
One of the biggest challenges that a contractor has when performing secured construction 
is the ability to maintain a large enough workforce with security clearances to perform 
the work.  Many of the projects, especially federal projects, require contractors and 
employees to have the necessary security clearance level to perform a project.  The three 
common clearance levels and what determines the level at which the work is classified 
are as follows:  
Top Secret shall be applied to information the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national 
security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. 
 
Secret shall be applied to information the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that 
the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. 
 
Confidential shall be applied to information the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the 
original classification authority is able to identify or describe. 
Clearances for individuals are granted by the agency which is providing the work.  The 
required background information necessary to grant a clearance is agency and sometimes 
project specific.  In DoD generally a secret / confidential clearance can be granted 
relatively quickly (1-3 months) and requires a limited investigation.  A top secret 
clearance is very involved and costly endeavor in which an individual’s background is 
fully reviewed to ensure they can be entrusted with sensitive national security 
information.  This process can take on average from six to eighteen months to complete 
therefore the contractor will need to already have managers and workers with a top secret 
clearance prior to bidding.  The other challenge with projects of this type is everyone on 
the jobsite will need to have the appropriate clearance level to include subcontractors.  
Finding some of the specialized subcontractors such as fire protection who have 
clearances can sometime be difficult and may completely limit any chance of competition 
between subs.  The other problem may be that workers with clearances have to work in 
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 construction trades which they aren’t familiar with.  For example a carpenter who is 
accustomed to performing vertical construction may have to lay carpet due to there being 
no cleared carpet installers and the time and effort to get one cleared is not feasible.  It is 
for this reason that the owner must closely scrutinize the clearance requirements of all 
projects because the pool of individuals available to perform the work decreases as the 
level of clearance increases.       
4.3.2  Material Procurement 
Purchasing of material on a classified project can be much different than simply going to 
the local supply store.  For certain federal agencies the threat of espionage and the 
sensitivity of discussions are so great that extraordinary measures are taken to ensure that 
material is not compromised.  One approach is the use of random purchase.  This method 
requires that the buyer of material (either contractor or government) purchases material at 
as many different suppliers as practical.  It also means choosing randomly which items 
are selected off the shelf (i.e. some from the front and some from the back).  Other times 
the purchase of material may have to be done so the material purchased isn’t connected 
with either the agency or the function.  In this case a third party who has no linkage to 
either the contractor or agency is used to purchase the material.  This may be done so the 
capabilities of the material cannot be tied to the agency or the facility at which it is being 
installed. 
4.3.3  Subcontractor Coordination 
Unlike most projects where it is important for all parties to understand the overall project 
on a classified project there may in fact be few individuals who have a complete set of 
drawings.  Each subcontractor is given only those drawings which apply to their trade.  
Despite having a clearance there is still the idea of “need to know”.  Though this may be 
counter to good construction practices the need to limit the security risks become more 
important.  The fewer people who see the complete set of drawings and understand the 
complete scope of work the lesser the chance for a security compromise.  The other 
challenge with classified drawings is they must be in kept in an approved secure location.  
Depending on the nature of the site this may mean that drawings have to be viewed in a 
separate area from where the work is occurring or the drawings may have to be modified 
in order to declassify them. 
4.3.4  Communication  
All communication on a project will be of a sensitive nature.  Therefore communication 
can not occur via email or telephone.  Instead the project team must use some form of a 
classified computer exchange (DoD uses SIPERNET) and special secured telephone 
communications (STU – III) which encrypts the dialog.  Any communications of a 
sensitive nature must also be held in a location that has been approved for that clearance 
level.  The communication restrictions that are applied can be extremely challenging for a 
project manager but are necessary to ensure the security of the overall project.    
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 4.4 OVERALL IMPACT 
This section looked at the impact terrorism has had on the procurement / construction 
phase of a project lifecycle.  The need to perform unique projects has created a larger 
demand for the design-build approach.  This method of delivery has gained increased 
support and will continue to do so in the future.  Another challenge facing a project team 
is the difficulty of working on classified projects.  Certain activities which are second 
nature like open and honest communication are not necessarily the norm on projects 
which are of a secured nature.  In fact it may be just the opposite where the goal is to 
provide the minimal amount of information to project stakeholders to complete the 
project.  Working in this type of environment can make the job of project manager much 
more difficult. 
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 CHAPTER 5  CONCLUSION 
   
The definition of terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a 
person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of 
intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political 
reasons.  Using this definition it can be seen that the attacks on 9/11 was clearly terrorism 
in its purest form.  An organized group in the form of Al Qaeda performed violent attacks 
with the hopes of intimidating the American people and beginning a campaign of global 
religious war.  It is certainly true that American society was intimidated following the 
attacks creating a wave of hysteria that reached across the United States.   
 
As a result, the government and other private industry moved swiftly to protect 
themselves against further attacks.  The construction industry, as the builders of society, 
was called upon to fix many of the security lapses which existed throughout the country.  
Accordingly, certain sectors of the industry flourished in the post 9/11 world while other 
projects became less attractive to investors in such uncertain times were put on hold or 
scrapped all together.  Either way many in the industry adapted to the needs of society.  
Security and force protection projects were on the rise.  Owners were tasked to evaluate 
project priorities and consider what responsibility they owed to their employees to ensure 
a safe working environment.  Designers were being asked to design protective measures 
into buildings helping to prevent or mitigate possible damage as a result of an attack.  
Finally, constructors were asked to quickly mobilize following the attacks and were often 
working within a secured construction environment in which they may or may not have 
been accustomed to.   
 
It’s is therefore critical for the construction industry to gather their collective resources 
and work jointly to help in securing the nation against future attacks.  Some of the lasting 
memories from this most difficult time in American history will be those construction 
crews who worked around the clock at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon to help 
heel the scars of this Nation.  It was the effort of these workers as well as other less 
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